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Abstract
Deep learning with medical data often requires larger samples sizes than are avail-
able at single providers. While data sharing among institutions is desirable to train
more accurate and sophisticated models, it can lead to severe privacy concerns due
the sensitive nature of the data. This problem has motivated a number of studies
on distributed training of neural networks that do not require direct sharing of the
training data. However, simple distributed training does not offer provable privacy
guarantees to satisfy technical safe standards and may reveal information about
the underlying patients. We present a method to train neural networks for clini-
cal data in a distributed fashion under differential privacy. We demonstrate these
methods on two datasets that include information from multiple independent sites,
the eICU collaborative Research Database and The Cancer Genome Atlas.
1 Introduction
Machine learning for healthcare requires balancing the need for large participant populations with
the responsibility to maintain the privacy of individual participants. This tradeoff has become par-
ticularly apparent in the era of large-scale deep neural networks, which have been shown to be very
effective for many healthcare applications but frequently require more data than available at any in-
dividual institution [Ching et al., 2018]. Efforts such as the eICU Collaborative Research Database
and The Cancer Genome Atlas have sought to overcome institutional data limitations by creating
centralized repositories of patient data for research. However, centralized solutions generally re-
quire time- and resource-intensive deidentification processes that in many cases do not guarantee
protection against re-identification. In particular, the addition of rich sources of patient data such
as genomic measurements or retinal images make safe deidentification extremely difficult without
significantly compromising data utility [Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017].
Distributed training provides one strategy for building models across institutions without requiring
individual institutions to share their raw patient data externally. However, distributed training itself
does not guarantee patient privacy, as common strategies typically involve sharing model weights
that can potentially expose information about study participants. Motivated by the need to pro-
vide formal privacy guarantees, we develop a new distributed training method under differential
privacy [Dwork et al., 2006], a stringent privacy notion that guarantees that no individual patient’s
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data has a significant influence on the information released about the dataset. In particular, we incor-
porate differential privacy with cyclical weight transfer [Chang et al., 2018], by training deep neural
networks under differential privacy in a distributed fashion. As a result, bounds on the amount of
identifying information belonging to a certain individual can be quantified and minimized.
1.1 Related work
Chang et al. [2018] illustrated the ability to use cyclical weight transfer to train deep neural net-
works for image classification on two imaging datasets (retinal fundus photographs and mammog-
raphy images) across four simulated institutions. While a promising proof of concept, this work
simulates the different institutions by randomly sampling with equal class distributions. They at-
tempted to add noise via resolution changes and class imbalances, but this simulation does not
consider real world institutional biases that may be present in the data. By the same token, the work
includes images only, and does not consider other types of clinical data. Most relevantly to this
work, Chang et al. [2018] applied no privacy measures to the weights. Given that the weights are
transferred many times between institutions, this causes potential privacy leakage of the underlying
data during training. Furthermore, the lack of privacy guarantees means that even the fully-trained
model itself may be queried for membership inference, revealing inclusion of individuals in the train-
ing set. Narayanan and Shmatikov [2008], El Emam et al. [2011], and Homer et al. [2008] illustrate
examples of general reidentification attacks and Fredrikson et al. [2015] and Shokri et al. [2017]
demonstrate membership inference attacks first given a machine learning model and then as black
box attacks. These attacks demonstrate the necessity to offer privacy protection at the model level.
Abadi et al. [2016] developed a method to train deep neural networks under differential privacy, but
their initial method required centralized data. Shokri and Shmatikov [2015] provided a private col-
laborative learning protocol. While their protocol also works in a distributed fashion, it requires a
central server to coordinate the learning among the participants and heavy communication during
training—at each iteration of their gradient descent method, each participant needs to send informa-
tion of their local gradients to the server. In comparison, our protocol is fully distributed (without
any central coordinator) and only requires infrequent communication among the participants. In ad-
dition, our work crucially uses the privacy accountant developed by Mironov [2017], which allows
us to keep track of the cumulative privacy loss through Rényi differential privacy—an alternative
privacy measure that can also be converted back to standard differential privacy guarantee. This in
particular enables us to perform a tighter privacy loss analysis compared to standard composition
theorems in differential privacy.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
2.1.1 eICU Collaborative Research Database
The eICU Collaborative Research Database (Pollard et al. [2018]) is a retrospective, deidentified,
critical care database organized by Philips Health Care and the MIT Laboratory for Computational
Physiology. It is comprised of 208 institutions and currently includes records of 200,859 patient
stays. For this study we included patient demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity, weight),
information about the admitting unit (type, source), as well as the 50 most common diagnoses and
laboratory tests (counts and values) occurring in the first 24 hours after admission. We predict
mortality for patients who were discharged or expired after more than 24 hours at the largest five
participating sites.
2.1.2 The Cancer Genome Atlas
The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA) (Weinstein et al. [2010]) project aims to construct a comprehen-
sive, publicly-available set of cancer genome, transcriptome, and clinical profiles. Patient data is
classified by both cancer type and tissue collection site. For this study, we focused on 994 breast
invasive carcinoma (BRCA) patients divided among 38 distinct sites. We created a population-level
panel of the 500 genes with the most variant expression, and differentiated the two major subtypes
of breast cancer: lobular and ductal. These subtypes differ in terms of treatment response and clini-
cal presentation are normally differentiated based on manual histology review. While differentially
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expressed genes between the two classes have been identified, the subtypes are not characterized by
single sources of variation. Attempts at unsupervised clustering based on gene expression failed to
differentiate lobular from ductal cancers (Korkola et al. [2003]).
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Distributed deep learning with differential privacy
Algorithm 1 specifies the distributed training procedurewith differential privacy and is adapted from
the centralized version specified by Abadi et al. [2016].
Algorithm 1 Training distributed deep learning networks under differential privacy
1: procedure TRAINING(Sites S=(s1, ...sn) of datasets D=(D1, ..., Dn) and models
M=(m1, ...mn), parameters: noise value σ, epochs E, batch size b, learning rate η, gra-
dient clip norm C = σ/b, loss function L(θ) = 1
N
∑
i L(θ, xi, target privacy budget (ǫs, δs)
for each site s)
2: Initialize weights θ
3: for e ∈ {1, . . . , E} do
4: for s ∈ S do
5: for t in {1, . . . , |Ds|/b} do ⊲ For number of batches
6: Sample a batch Bt of b examples at random fromDs (with replacement)
7: for each i in this Bt do
8: compute gt(xi) = ∇θL(θ, xi) ⊲ Compute Per Example Gradient
9: gt(xi) = gt(xi)/max
(
1,
‖gt(xi)‖2
C
)
⊲ Clip the l2 Norm of Gradient
10: gt =
1
b
(
∑
i gt(xi) +N (0, σ
2C2I)) ⊲ Add noise
11: θ = θ − η gt ⊲ Take gradient descent step
12: Compute cumulative privacy loss with privacy accountant
13: if Privacy budget (ǫs, δs) is exhausted then
14: Remove s from S
15: Transfer weights θ to the next site
16: Output final weights as w ⊲ Store the weights for cyclical transfer
For each training epoch (e), we iterate over each site (s). Within the site we train for number of
examples at the site divided by the batch size but choose each batch by randomly sampling with
replacement. Within each batch we compute the gradient on a per example basis and then clip the l2
norm of each gradient to establish the maximum bound of any singular gradient. We then add noise
proportionate to σ. We continue training until the loss converges or the specified privacy budget is
expended (ǫ < 10, δ = 10−5),
2.2.2 Privacy Definition and Privacy Accountant
Our algorithm satisfies differential privacy, which informally requires that the trajectory of the re-
leased output weights throughout the cyclical training process does not reveal much information
about any individual patient at any of the sites. More formally:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [Dwork et al., 2006]). Let ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1). A (randomized) algorithm
A satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if for any pair datasets D andD′ that differ by one data record
and event S in the output range of A, the following holds
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
For every individual site, we keep tack of the privacy loss parameters (ǫ, δ) over the course of
training. We leveraged privacy accountant by Mironov [2017], which provides tight bounds on
privacy loss parameters for applications including private SGD method. The privacy accountant
takes the sub-sampling rate of b/|Ds| and the noise rate σ as input.
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Table 1. AUROC for eICU Mortality prediction task based on number of institutions.
Institutions Central Central Private Distributed Distributed Private
1 0.743 0.683 0.738 0.662
2 0.760 0.720 0.762 0.706
3 0.794 0.780 0.789 0.753
4 0.804 0.785 0.797 0.780
5 0.808 0.789 0.801 0.792
Table 2. AUROC for TCGA classification task based on number of participating sites.
Sites Central Central Private Distributed Distributed Private
1 0.657 0.644 0.650 0.643
2 0.715 0.723 0.719 0.701
3 0.767 0.751 0.761 0.744
3 Empirical Evaluation
3.1 eICU Application
We tested our method on the eICU data in four different forms (Table 1), 1.) Central, all data
is aggregated together and trained without any privacy constraints, 2.) Central private, all data
is aggregated together and trained under differential privacy, 3.) Distributed, data is kept at each
institution and training occurs via cyclical weight transfer, 4.) Distributed, data is kept at each
institutions and training occurs via cyclical weight transfer under differential privacy. We included
the five largest institutions as the training data (N = 27,395) and the next five largest institutions at
the testing data (N = 20,117). Privacy was calculated on a per institution-basis in order to define
the risk of an institution participating in model training. We required a δ maximum value of 10−5
and found an ǫ value of 2.88 in the central private example (σ = 0.5, batch size = 100, N = 27,395,
epochs = 5) and a maximum of 3.84 in the distributed example (N = 4,328).
3.2 TCGA Application
TCGA data was trained using similar forms as the eICU data. RNAseq expression profiles for 994
BRCA patients were min-max normalized and the 500 genes with the highest variance in expression
were used to create a panel. Only expression profiles corresponding to tumor samples were included,
and profiles from patients with more than one tumor sample were averaged together. Composite sites
were created based on TCGA-provided Tissue Site Codes. For this analysis, patients from Tissue
Sites with codes starting with ’A’ or ’B’ were assigned to Sites 2 and 3 respectively, while remaining
patients were assigned to Site 1.
This analyses included low sample counts and provided a challenging domain for method evaluation
(Table 2). We required a δ maximum value of 10−5 and found an ǫ value of 5.87 in the single site
central private example, 5.25 for all sites and a maximum ǫ value of 6.11 in the distributed example.
The largest ǫ value for the distributed example is found at the smallest participating site, site #3.
4 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we provide a differentially private distributed learning protocol that leverages the
idea of cyclical weight transfer. Compared to prior work Shokri and Shmatikov [2015], our method
removes the need of a centralized coordinator and significantly reduces the frequent communication
among different sites. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates it is feasible to deploy a distributed
machine learning protocol that enjoys a provable differential privacy guarantee, without making
large performance sacrifices.
There are several interesting future directions. First, since the data at each site might be drawn
from a different distribution, we can potentially target slightly different models to each site. We can
consider a hybrid training method that trains a shared representation with data across all the sites,
and also trains a "fine-tuning" mapping for each individual site to capture local trends and biases
[Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2016]. Second, we need to handle the case in which an individual site might
have only a small amount of data (e.g. N < 100) where it is difficult to extract useful information
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from the site under differential privacy. Small samples sizes are increasingly relevant given added
dimensionality (pharmacogenetics etc.). Many problems in healthcare suffer from significant class
imbalance, but each of the common methods for controlling this have privacy implications. We
would like to develop ways to control for this without privacy implications or in a manner where it
can be easily accounted for.
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